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This well-written and intriguing study reveals that the project of mod-
ernization and/or development has many flaws and remains precarious, 
with major social problems, many of them new, to overcome.
Jon Abbink, African Studies Centre, Leiden University
Understanding the Somali Conflagration: Identity, Political 
Islam and Peacebuilding, by Afyare Abdi Elmi
London: Pluto Press, 2010; pp. 224. $35.00 paper.
Afyare Abdi Elmi is to be commended. He pulls no punches in Understand-
ing the Somali Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding. Even 
better, he gives us a book that is easy to read and helps make sense of the 
recent past, as well as some of the present. I write “some of the present” 
because the manuscript clearly went to the publisher before the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was fully underway and before the 
recent drought devolved into yet another famine. Unfortunately, piracy 
receives less attention in this account than readers might expect, but that 
may only further reflect the challenges that inhere in writing books (rather 
than blogs) about contemporary events.
A second reason for my cautionary note—that this book can only help 
make sense of the Somali situation—is that, as with all things Somali, one 
point of view will not suffice, and Elmi has a particular point of view. 
That being said, his point of view is well worth paying attention to. He 
convincingly condemns Ethiopia’s meddling in Somalia, is highly critical 
of the United States, favors peace building that includes Islamists, and is 
much more realistic than many about the tensions that inhere in nation- or 
state-building when clans and Islam both continue to hold sway—which, 
as he points out, they do, both in Somalia and beyond Somalia in the 
diaspora.
Elmi builds on others’ work to offer a compelling definition of peace: 
“peace is understood as the presence of skills and processes for dealing 
with conflicts non-violently” (12). In other words, he does not assume 
away rivalries, factionalization, or the fighting that is always bound to 
occur over the levers of power, or over vital assets like ports, airports, 
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import-export licenses, and the like. As he points out, in the Somali instance, 
clan affiliations have long been instrumentalized; indeed, thanks to clans 
and to decades’ worth of clan-based conflict, factions come to politicians 
and/or warlords virtually ready-made.
Meanwhile, only three “institutions” can effectively cross-cut clans and 
thereby appeal to all Somalis: elders, provided they use heer (traditional 
methods of arbitration) to settle disputes; Islam; and the nation. None, of 
course, are institutions per se. But neither are they mutually exclusive.
The weakest of these three identities is clearly Somali national identity. 
No robust sense of nationalism exists. Presumably, if such a thing had been 
developed, Somalia would not have dissolved into so many competing 
pieces and parts. Governance stopped being good back in the 1970s, and 
it took a real turn for the worse, according to Elmi, when President Siad 
Barre demonized members of the Majertein clan in the wake of Somalia’s 
defeat by Ethiopia in the Ogaden War. Clan-based militias, and not just clan 
politics, have riven Somalia ever since.
Consequently, anyone who thinks it possible to reconstruct a Somali 
state by appealing to Somali national identity is chewing more than just qat, 
while building a functional Somali state that can infuse a sense of national-
ism will not work either, without first reaching enforceable agreements 
about power-sharing, which means determining who gets to discuss who 
gets to share power, which in turn depends on who is invited to the talks, 
which itself depends on who is holding them and why. Or to put it differ-
ently: examine who has been invited to peace talks in the past along with 
who has been left out. This generally explains who becomes a spoiler—and 
why peace never holds.
Elmi finds it particularly egregious that no one ever invites all the 
players to the table and that discussions are never left up to Somalis alone, 
though he also acknowledges that if outsiders were not involved, peace 
talks might not be held at all—which presents just one of the conundrums 
this slim book elucidates.
External actors loom large in Elmi’s account, as well they should. As 
Elmi makes clear, Somalia’s two most powerful neighbors—Ethiopia and 
Kenya—have parallel though not exactly identical interests in the space 
formerly known as Somalia. Ethiopia, for instance, wants as weak a Somalia 
as possible, and would prefer many mutually hostile mini-states. Kenya, for 
its part, stands to gain little from a strong Somalia except fewer refugees, 
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though refugees serve a useful purpose since they generate large amounts 
of easy-to-skim relief money.
Elmi is surely not wrong in these assessments. However, while he al-
ludes to Ethiopia’s fraught history with Eritrea, which helps explain Eritrea’s 
support of Somali insurgents in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, he never consid-
ers the possibility that Somalia might appear to pose legitimate security 
concerns from Ethiopia’s perspective. Instead, Ethiopia is the perennial 
aggressor—which, for anyone who believes the Somali-populated Ogaden 
belongs with (if not also, by rights, to) Somalia, it is.
Elmi is no less trenchant about the United States’ role in backing 
Ethiopia’s incursions into Somalia, which he views as woeful. Here it is 
hard to disagree on two counts. First, the only thing the actions taken by 
Ethiopia were ever bound to do was unite numerous Somalis against it. But 
second, and perhaps even more importantly, it makes no sense to try to 
prevent Islamists from helping to re-create a Somali state. Yet this is what 
the United States has effectively done, by, with, and through Ethiopia’s 
invasion(s) and its own air and drone strikes.
Although Elmi does not say that a Somali cannot be Somali without 
belonging to a clan, he does say that no clan is strong enough to stitch a state 
back together or effectively smash its rivals, which is why conflict persists. 
Look to Islam, in contrast, and you can find something that overarches 
clans, something that all Somalis share. Thus, Islam needs to be considered 
part of the solution.
In fact, if the United States, Ethiopia, and others are not careful, their 
actions are likely to drive yet more Somalis toward Salafist and other 
orientations that Westerners really do not like. Elmi does not come out 
and say this quite so baldly, in part because he is far more interested in 
drawing attention to what is required to build peace and address Somalia’s 
statelessness. He is not interested in the United States’ shibboleths. Yet, he 
does recognize that so long as terrorism and Islamism preoccupy the United 
States, its and its allies’ actions will force more Somalis to turn to Arab (or 
even Iranian) sources of support.
This would be unfortunate. It is also unnecessary, especially when one 
considers that sufficient numbers of Somalis no more want to Arabize than 
they want to Westernize. The last time I was in the region (several years 
ago) enough adult Somalis still wanted their children to remain culturally 
Somali that if Washington assisted with these efforts, everyone would be 
134 n Book Reviews
better served. After all: what language do Somali parents speak when trying 
to raise their children to be good Muslims and good citizens? What food do 
Somalis eat when they break a fast? What clothes do men wear to mosque 
on Fridays? Evoke such things for any group of believers anywhere, and 
national attributes begin to emerge.
Could culturally strengthening the Somali nation help rebuild a Somali 
state? This is an unspoken question that haunts Elmi’s book. The immediate 
political science response would be “no.” But then ask yourself, who are 
the only people likely to build a well-governed state? The answer: those 
who think of themselves as Somali first and members of this or that clan 
(or mosque) second.
Again, Elmi does not frame his argument in quite this way, but the 
peace he seeks does require taking what already unites Somalis and helping 
Somalis put this to work. This is why it is impossible to disagree with him 
when he writes, “The international community’s peacebuilding efforts are 
not ideologically neutral; for the international community, governance and 
other peacebuilding efforts have to produce, eventually, a liberal democracy 
and a free market” (12). Elmi inclines against this idea. He wants Somalis 
to be able to develop something different—something that fits them. There 
is, as he says, “a mismatch between the Western ideology that drives 
peacebuilding efforts and the indigenous values and institutions that are 
present in Somalia” (128).
Elmi hones in on education in particular. He cites the 2007 Millennium 
Development Goals report, which indicates that “more than 81 percent 
of school-age children do not have access to education” (113). Tellingly, 
he never spells out exactly what a Somali “national identity education” 
should include. Similarly, he favors a more representative government 
that might consist of a bicameral legislature (along the lines of what has 
worked thus far in Somaliland), and advocates an inclusive, professional, 
and well-disciplined Somali security force, but offers few specifics on how 
to achieve either. This, too, is in keeping with his overall approach. He is 
much more detailed about what will not work (for example, federation or 
consociationalism) than about what should be put in place. I suspect this 
is because what he really wants to see happen is for committed (but non-
meddling) outsiders to assist with a transitional administration that would 
help rebuild state institutions while simultaneously offering all possible 
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Somali factions—including Islamists—the protected space within which to 
“define their issues,” discuss them, and strike a balance.
Is this realistic? Perhaps. However, one thing we know already is where 
not listening to Elmi will lead: to more of the same, while the longer Somalis 
go without being able to find something inclusively Somali to rally around, 
the greater the potential for further radicalization and violence—and med-
dling by external actors who do not have Somalis’ best interests at heart. 
That alone should be reason enough to take seriously Elmi’s arguments on 
behalf of Islamist approaches to stabilizing Somalia.
Another reason to take this book seriously: Elmi grinds no academic 
axes. Instead, this is an accessibly written book that offers plenty of material 
with which to spark many long overdue discussions—in classrooms, inside 
the Beltway, and among those both familiar and unfamiliar with all of the 
Horn’s recent conflagrations.
Anna Simons, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
Kumsaa Boroo: Jiruu fi Jireenya/Life and Times, by Kumsa Boro
Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2009; pp. 509. $39.95 paper.
This book is about the life and journey of an Oromo pastor, the Reverend 
Kumsa Boro, beginning in a small village, Gute, Western Oromiya, where 
he was born in 1910, and ending in an American metropolis, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, where he died in 2002. Starting life as a young cattle herder, 
he became a revered evangelist and a respected Oromo elder. His 92-year 
life journey was full of zigzags “punctuated by a succession of personal 
tragedies,” as Leenco Lata has correctly stated in the blurb. Boro joined the 
American Presbyterian missionaries in 1920, an event that opened a long 
chapter in his life. From the missionaries, he received modern education 
and became a pastor. As an evangelist, he preached the Gospel to the 
Oromo people, dedicating his time and energy to fight injustice so that the 
Oromo could enjoy their God-given rights, and respect and human dignity 
on this earth. In doing this, he carefully walked the thin line between being 
a preacher and being a human rights activist, and he clearly demonstrated 
that he could be both at the same time without one role negating the other. 
